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This article analyzes business power in the context of noisy politics by comparing 
business involvement in two British referendum campaigns: one about membership 
in the European Communities in 1975, and the Brexit referendum about European 
Union membership in 2016. By exploring these two contexts, the article seeks 
to identify the conditions under which business elites can and cannot be effective 
in a context of noisy politics. Three key factors are identified as determinants of 
business influence during periods of noisy politics: the incentives to get directly 
involved in noisy politics; the legitimacy of business involvement; and, finally, the 
capacity to act in a cohesive way. The article shows that these factors have changed 
substantially over the last four decades because of wider changes in the nature of 
capitalism, and their impact on business power in the United Kingdom and more 
generally is discussed.
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This article aims to contribute to the debate about business power under conditions of 
“noisy politics,” when policy issues are highly salient and popularly contested. 
Culpepper’s seminal study of “quiet politics” shows that business influence is generally 
at its greatest where it is exercised “quietly,” behind the scenes in technical discussions 
between representatives of business and government.1 Under such conditions, govern-
ment is likely to bend to the requirements of the business elite, not least because many 
of the issues of interest to business are very technical and hence of low salience to the 
general public. By contrast, when the salience of an issue is high and the media and 
public take an active interest, business power tends to be lower. Business may be more 
cautious, avoid taking a stance, or hedge its bets, for example, by donating to all the 
significant political parties during electoral campaigns.2 In the current age of populism, 
various aspects of economic policy and business influence are more actively contested 
by members of the public and NGOs, raising new challenges for business about how to 
act in noisy contexts.3 Therefore, this article investigates whether, and in what circum-
stances, business can influence politics in high-salience, noisy democratic contexts.
In order to assess this issue, we compare two referendum campaigns, one on the 
United Kingdom’s membership in the European Communities in 1975, the other on 
the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union in 2016.4 These campaigns 
can be viewed as particularly good examples of noisy, high-salience politics, given the 
degree of public contestation surrounding them and the high turnout (particularly in 
the 2016 referendum, when turnout was 72.2 percent compared to 68.7 percent in the 
2017 general election and 66.1 percent in the 2015 election; in 1975 turnout was 64.6 
percent). Although the issue at hand was similar, the role of business differed across 
the two campaigns as, crucially, did the outcomes, allowing us to analyze the factors 
contributing to varying degrees of business influence.
We identify three factors that are critical to the exercise of business influence under 
conditions of noisy politics—the incentives for exercising influence, the legitimacy of 
such interventions, and the capacity to intervene in the first place. We argue, first, that 
business interventions under conditions of noisy politics are partly reactive and a 
response to specific challenges perceived by business. Given that business involve-
ment under conditions of noisy politics requires considerable resources, the nature of 
the challenge shapes the stakes and the incentives as well as the degree of involvement 
in the issue. Business agency is more likely when there is a greater perceived urgency 
for it, most obviously where the labor movement and left-wing politics are challenging 
business and close to controlling the state in ways that would weaken business power, 
as in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. Second, business influence also depends on the 
legitimacy of the claims that business makes under conditions of noisy politics. If the 
electorate perceives such interventions as advancing sectional and narrow business 
interests and not as expressions of general concern about the health of the economy, 
then such intervention can backfire. It may undermine the broader legitimacy of busi-
ness influence across a range of areas and not just that of the initial cause. Business 
may therefore fear the impact of a mistimed intervention and stay out of the contro-
versy or intervene to a very limited extent. Third, we argue that the nature and organi-
zation of the business elite, particularly its organizational cohesiveness, is a key 
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prerequisite of effective business influence. We show that the fragmentation of the 
British business elite since the 1970s has weakened its capacity to exercise influence 
in a cohesive and effective way. This suggests the need for more research on the ways 
in which changes in the nature of capitalism during recent decades have affected the 
coordinating capacity and power of business.
The article is structured in the following way. First, we review the literature on 
business elites, quiet politics, and power. This discussion opens up a range of ques-
tions about the conditions under which business power is effective and the conditions 
under which it can be defeated. Second, we discuss the research design and compare 
the activities of the British business elites in 1975 and 2016.5 Third, we highlight the 
ways in which contextual factors, such as the mobilization of the labor movement and 
the perceived threat to business, shaped incentives for business mobilization and per-
ceptions of the legitimacy of its intervention during the two referendum campaigns. In 
the following section, we analyze how the changing nature of British capitalism has 
affected the cohesiveness of business and its capacity to exercise influence under con-
ditions of noisy politics. We show that these changes are associated with a fragmenta-
tion of British business that has weakened its capacity to act as a cohesive elite. In the 
final discussion and conclusion, we develop the implications of our analysis for under-
standing the interaction between business elites, structural power, and national politi-
cal economies under conditions of noisy politics.
Business Elites and Business Power
The importance of business power has waxed and waned as a research topic in the 
social sciences, reaching its first peak of influence with C. Wright Mills’s study of the 
power elite.6 Accepting the critique advanced by many pluralists and empirical social 
scientists that some claims about power are hard to verify, political scientists have 
tended to focus on lobbying and the active exercise of influence by business, generally 
referred to as instrumental power.7 Related research programs have examined the 
activities of individual firms and interest groups as well as collective action by broader 
classes of businesses in employers’ associations.8 In many cases united business elites, 
often led by dominant sectors, such as key export industries, exercise disproportionate 
influence on policymakers. Such lobbying activities are rarely matched in their extent 
or influence by labor or social movements, although cross-class coalitions in European 
coordinated market economies suggest that they may at times be complementary, as 
discussed in Peter Swenson’s historical analysis of the emergence of collective wage 
bargaining in Sweden.9 More recently, it has been shown that business influence can 
promote “winner-take-all politics” that benefits narrow business interests at the 
expense of other parts of society and may arguably undermine democratic representa-
tion, especially in the United States.10 This research shows that various factors contrib-
ute to successful and effective articulations of business power, such as cohesive 
business interests and strong organizations articulating them, as well as lobbying and 
campaign contributions that shape elections and decision making. Instrumental power 
can also operate where there are expectations of revolving doors, linking 
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policymaking in government and regulatory organizations to individuals moving in 
from influential positions in private sector organizations, thus contributing to a shared 
cognitive and normative framework as well as shared preferences and interests.11
Research on instrumental power often focuses on specific issues and competition 
between various groups (of which business is just one) in order to see who wins out. 
As a result, it was subject to the critique in the classic “three faces of power debate”: 
power is not just about winning conflicts over particular decisions. Power is also 
about nondecisions, that is, the fact that certain issues are kept off the decision-
making agenda. It was this latter development in particular that prompted the inter-
est in structural power in the 1970s both from Marxist and non-Marxist researchers.12 
The main premise of that research was that the structural position of business in the 
economy vests considerable power in individual firms and also in the business sec-
tor as a whole, because it creates a structural dependence of the state on capital.13 
That is, the state cannot operate effectively unless business is doing well because it 
relies on business for tax revenues and employment, which are essential to the func-
tioning of the state. Therefore, the state has to maintain the conditions that facilitate 
business. If governments ignore this fact, capital will strike, that is, not invest or 
invest elsewhere.14 A capital strike will lead to economic downturn, and govern-
ments, fearing the electoral consequences, will be forced to backpedal to prevent the 
exit of capital. The rise of globalization from the 1980s created new opportunities 
for businesses to relocate their activities to other countries and contributed to their 
structural power, often in ways that enabled them to influence or resist government 
policy and regulation.15
Increasingly, however, research has highlighted that the ways and conditions in 
which structural power is effective need further investigation. While structural power 
sometimes operates automatically, it may also be evoked strategically by business elites 
as a prediction about the dire consequences to follow if a particular policy is pursued.16 
This cue may activate the very effects it is describing if the warning is believed in finan-
cial markets. The markets may then start to go down as investors and firms respond to 
negative news, pulling investment, selling off currency, raising interest rates, disposing 
of government bonds, and backing off buying new bonds.17 Crisis conditions are cre-
ated for economies to which politicians have to respond. In such cases the operation of 
structural power is not automatic; its strategic use requires actors to articulate these 
warnings and others to act on them. What this scenario suggests is that structural power 
in the abstract is not necessarily sufficient to explain business success in policymaking; 
it needs to be accompanied by an understanding of the context and the salience of the 
issue at stake.18 This affects business incentives to enter into such debates. Are the 
issues at stake sufficiently crucial and clear cut to make it worth devoting resources and 
risking defeat, which would have consequences not just for the particular issue but for 
the legitimacy of business as an actor in noisy politics?
These processes are also shaped by the nature of the collective representation of 
business. Effective organizations for interest representation are generally seen to 
enhance instrumental power and to be a key prerequisite for achieving a common 
view among business actors, not least because business preferences and power 
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often vary greatly across countries, sectors, and sometimes across firms within the 
same sector as well.19 Thus the single “voice” of business may be drowned out by 
a cacophony of other voices undermining the ability of business to develop a fram-
ing that is strong enough to exert pressure on governments during times of noisy 
politics. However, as Cornelia Woll has pointed out, collective representation may 
not always be a necessary prerequisite for business influence; her research on bank 
bailouts shows that disorganization can enhance structural power, if it makes 
assigning clear responsibility and arranging negotiations harder.20 It is not suffi-
cient to analyze general business interests. Such research needs to be complemented 
with studies of individual sectors and firms, at particular moments and conjunc-
tures, to show, first, the degree to which there are shared interests or firm and sec-
tor-specific interests and, second, how different states respond to complex 
configurations of firms and interests.21
A third strand of research addresses the “third face of power”22 and the importance 
of what seems to be voluntary acquiescence to the preferences expressed by powerful 
actors. This notion is related to “ideational power,” which may result in cognitive 
capture of the state or society at large by business elites. Ideational power can have 
multiple sources. Under conditions of quiet politics, such power is exercised when 
regulators rely on firms for expertise, information, and collaboration and such techni-
cal issues have low salience for the electorate.23 More generally, the persuasiveness of 
business ideas is also affected by the legitimacy of business, including the notion that 
“what’s good for Walmart, is good for America” and other framings highlighting the 
general benefits of business claims.24 Bowman, Sukhdev, and Williams describe these 
as “trade narratives” that work by accumulating lists of benefits and, especially impor-
tant, occluding costs.25 The purpose is to preframe the discourses of the media and 
political classes about the contribution of a particular sector and, as a result, which 
policies are conceivable. Certain assumptions may not even be questioned because 
they are hegemonic or taken for granted. Although such dominant understandings tend 
to be quite robust, they may be disrupted at times of economic crises and under condi-
tions of “noisy politics,” when public interest is high.26 When business is faced with an 
arena of competing, high-volume alternatives and a highly voluble and involved elec-
torate, including voters challenging the legitimacy of these trade narratives, then such 
assumptions may be undermined, especially where the choice is embedded in a politi-
cally controversial contest like the Brexit referendum. In such circumstances, govern-
ments may find electoral imperatives drawing them away from supporting business 
and risking the consequences of structural power.
The crucial challenge for research on business power, therefore, is to explain the 
variations in its effectiveness and when business prevails or not. This article seeks to 
identify the specific factors that contribute to varying degrees of effectiveness under 
conditions of noisy politics, when business intervention is costly and its success is 
uncertain. We argue that it is necessary to consider three sets of factors to understand 
the exercise of business power under such conditions—the incentives for business 
involvement, its legitimacy, and business’s capacity to engage in concerted action, 
which depends on the nature and organization of business.
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Research Design: A Tale of Two Referenda
Our strategy for assessing business power under conditions of noisy politics and high 
salience is to focus on a paired comparison of two British referenda, on membership 
in the European Communities (in 1975) and the European Union (in 2016).27 We draw 
on a range of primary and secondary sources to provide a detailed account of the role 
of business in the two referenda. Taking this approach allows us to control for several 
factors.28 Not only did the referenda occur in the same country and pertain to the same 
issues, but both took place in conditions where the ruling party was deeply divided 
over the question of EC/EU membership.29 These were also periods of noisy politics, 
with a wide range of groups actively debating and disagreeing over the direction the 
United Kingdom should take. In both cases, business’s voice was linked to fears that 
if the decision went against it, there would be a potential exit of capital with a negative 
impact on the economy. There are also key differences that enable us to explore busi-
ness influence on the two campaigns. As we show in this article, business was more 
united and active in making the case for membership of the European Communities in 
1975 than it was in the 2016 campaign.
In 1975 the British business elite threw large amounts of money into the campaign 
to influence both their employees and the general public. The Yes campaign outspent 
No by a large amount in a significant assertion of instrumental power. Business was 
almost entirely united around the need for a Yes vote. In a survey for the Times in April 
1975, 415 out of 419 chairmen of major companies said they wanted to stay in.30 The 
degree of commitment to the Yes vote coming from all levels of business, from large, 
medium-size, and small firms in all sectors was massive, and the Economist reported 
that around 150 of the United Kingdom’s top 200 companies were getting actively 
involved in the campaign.31 Similarly, “the Institute of Directors told members that 
they had a ‘clear duty’ to ‘be bold in expressing their views’: ‘the Boardroom must 
lead,’” which Robert Saunders describes as a “levée en masse by Britain’s commercial 
sector of a kind never before seen at a national election.”32 At the instigation of the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), 800 companies appointed executives as “Mr. 
Europe” with the purpose of coordinating the pro-EC mobilization and communicat-
ing directly to their workforce, shareholders, and the public, and leaflets were distrib-
uted in workplaces and even in wage packets.33 Barely a voice was raised by any 
business interest in favor of coming out of the European Communities in 1975. David 
Butler and Uwe Kitzinger state that
the anti-Marketeers fell into two main camps—those like Douglas Jay or Barbara Castle 
who focused mainly on food prices, unemployment and other practical disadvantages of 
Community membership and those like Enoch Powell, Neil Marten and Michael Foot 
whose main concern was with national independence and parliamentary sovereignty.34
“The solidarity of the business community and the farmers’ organizations,” Saunders 
says of those in favor of the Yes vote, “was notable and the uniform results across the 
nation showed how little sectional appeals would probably have achieved had either 
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side really sought to use them.”35 The result was that 67.2 percent had voted Yes and 
32.8 percent had voted No on a turnout of 64.6 percent.
By contrast, in 2016, many large businesses based in the United Kingdom did sup-
port Remain, as did the main collective grouping of employers, the CBI. In the finan-
cial sector, the Bank of England, the City of London Corporation, and the British 
Bankers Association all supported the Remain campaign. However, business was not 
as united or as active as it had been in 1975; rather, “business was divided over the 
merits of Brexit.”36 A survey published by the Institute of Directors in the run-up to the 
referendum estimated that its membership was divided, with two-thirds supporting 
remaining in the European Union and one-third favoring Brexit, but with levels of 
support for Remain within the CBI and the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) 
estimated to be higher.37 Such divisions were reflected in the 2016 campaign, which 
unlike 1975 resulted in the vote in favor of Brexit by a margin of 52 to 48 percent with 
a high turnout of 72.2 percent.
Downing Street aimed to launch the referendum with a letter signed by big business 
leaders in favor of remain. Only one-third of FTSE 100 companies signed the letter, and 
many large companies, such as Barclays, RBS, Sainsburys, and Tesco, stayed notice-
ably silent. Another business organization, the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), 
which represented small businesses, explicitly refused to endorse either side, although 
its director general spoke in favor of Brexit, which led to his being forced to resign. In 
the City of London, there were also dissenting voices from the widespread pro-Remain 
sentiment.38 In the period leading up to the referendum, there had been increasing con-
flict between the City and the European Union. Scott James and Lucia Quaglia note that 
“the City itself is deeply divided on the Brexit issue, constraining industry’s capacity to 
organize collectively to influence policymakers.”39 Scott Lavery’s study of how the 
CBI and other employers’ organizations interacted with EU regulatory policy in the 
sphere of social and employment policy also sheds light on these tensions.40 Drawing 
from responses to a survey conducted by the government in 2014 of British business 
views on these policies, Lavery notes that very few EU social and employment policies 
were viewed positively by the British business groups; certain directives, especially the 
Working Time Directive and the Agency Worker Directive, were seen as having a nega-
tive impact on business, creating large “compliance costs.” The remainder of the article 
seeks to account for the striking contrast between active business mobilization in 1975 
and the more ambiguous, even passive, stance in 2016.
Incentives for Business Mobilization and the Legitimacy 
of Intervention
Despite some important similarities between the 1970s and 2010s, notably in terms of 
the general sense of crisis, there are also important contextual differences that shape 
business influence. This section analyzes the incentives for mobilizing and exercising 
business power and the legitimacy of business intervention across the two campaigns, 
as well as the impact of these factors.
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In the UK context, the 1970s mark a transition period from the Keynesian era of 
relative prosperity and full employment of the late 1950s and 1960s to the Thatcher 
years of neoliberalism. The 1970s were characterized by a series of crises in the 
British economy culminating in IMF “rescue” and the “Winter of Discontent.” 
Commentators asked, “Is Britain governable?” and “Why is Britain becoming harder 
to govern?”41 The roots of the crisis were widely identified with the growing power 
of trade unions and in particular local shop stewards, who increasingly challenged 
management over shop-floor practices, the organization of the working day, and the 
rewards of piecework and payment-by-results wage systems. In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, both Labour and Conservative governments sought to constrain trade 
union rights by the introduction of legislation and, when that failed, to develop prices 
and income policies that would induce wage restraint in return for price controls on 
key commodities. Efforts to form these moves into a full-fledged corporatist bargain-
ing system failed because peak associations such as the TUC and the CBI were unable 
to control their members.42
Marxist-inspired economists framed the crisis in terms of “British workers and 
the profits squeeze,” arguing that the growing power of trade unions was eating into 
the profits of British capitalism and leading to a “strike of capital” and a reduction 
in investment in the United Kingdom.43 Other authors blamed the crisis on the ama-
teurism of British managers and their inability to manage the workforce properly. 
Such concerns were seen to contribute to Britain’s lack of competitive producers and 
the relative decline of the British economy, especially compared to more rapidly 
growing European economies.44 These factors, combined with increasing competi-
tion in home and overseas markets by German and Japanese manufacturers, dramati-
cally worsened the United Kingdom’s balance of payments position, leading to the 
need for IMF support in 1976 and, in return for that support, the beginning of signifi-
cant cuts in welfare and other state spending. The cuts contributed in turn to a series 
of public sector pay disputes, culminating in the 1978–79 Winter of Discontent, and 
Thatcher’s first election victory in 1979, followed by eighteen continuous years of 
Conservative government.
However, on the left, there was a ferment of energy associated with what was 
termed the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES). The ferment built on both the fail-
ure of a number of key firms (such as British Leyland and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders) 
in the early 1970s and scandals associated with incompetent and in some cases cor-
rupt managers and financiers at the time. The 1972 “Labour’s programme for Britain” 
largely reflected the ideas of the left wingers within the party, including a number of 
proposals that many businesses perceived as hostile to their interests, such as 
expanded public ownership and a greater emphasis on economic planning.45 The sub-
sequent Labour government set up the National Enterprise Board (NEB), in which it 
placed ailing companies and sought to revive them under state ownership. The promi-
nent left winger Tony Benn served as secretary of state for industry for fifteen months 
in 1974–75. With trade union power still strong and growing state ownership via the 
NEB, as well as the development of mechanisms for the control of prices and incomes, 
an alternative economic strategy emerged that was based on increasing state 
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involvement in the economy (with some elements of worker democracy), backed by 
strongly protectionist policies that would prevent foreign competition undermining 
home industry. Although some elements never became official Labour Party policy 
and actual government initiatives in 1974–75 were perceived as less radical than 
previous policy proposals during the years in opposition, the strength of the left-wing 
approach within the Labour Party and the trade unions represented a major challenge 
to British business.
The 1975 referendum was an important moment in these processes, and the govern-
ing Labour Party was divided. The left of the Labour Party led by Tony Benn opposed 
continued membership of the European Communities, a position supported at a special 
conference of the Labour Party in April 1975 where the votes split around 65 to 35 
percent in both the constituency and the trade union sections of the party’s electoral 
college. Prime Minister Harold Wilson, supported by most of his cabinet, refused to 
commit himself to the No vote although he did allow ministers to support the No cam-
paign. The small number of ministers (most prominent of whom was Benn) that did so 
were mostly those associated in some way with developing the AES.46 Winning a No 
vote would pull the United Kingdom out of the European Communities and allow the 
AES to be implemented and with it a fundamental shift in power from business toward 
the labor movement.
Business elites highlighted the interaction of the EC membership question with 
these broader economic and social policy issues. Failure to act collectively to defeat 
the No campaign was seen to be potentially disastrous, not just in the short term but 
also for what sort of society the United Kingdom was going to become. By staying in 
the European Communities, business would have access to new markets and be able 
to protect itself from left-wing policies of “socialism in one country,” as the AES 
became known. Some industrialists talked about how British firms and British man-
agement would have to modernize in the light of the increased competition likely to be 
experienced as the European Communities developed. Such modernization would also 
be facilitated by EC membership and easier access to learning about new management 
techniques from abroad. More important, business elites were able to carry this strat-
egy through their usual political channels of the Conservative Party. There were few 
dissenters from the party’s commitment to the Yes campaign, despite some remaining 
nostalgia for Empire and Commonwealth centered on Enoch Powell. It was the Tories 
after all who had taken the United Kingdom into the European Communities in 1973, 
so even the newly elected leader of the party and future arch-Eurosceptic, Margaret 
Thatcher, campaigned enthusiastically for the Yes vote. The No campaign was thus 
made to look like a confused alliance of the extreme right and the extreme left, while 
the Yes campaign occupied a broad middle ground.
These events were part of a wider battle for the maintenance of a capitalist order in 
the United Kingdom, which, commentators argued, might be becoming “ungovern-
able” because of the conflicts between capital and labor that became worse when the 
Heath Tory government was formed in 1970. There were miners’ strikes in 1972 and 
1974. The latter led to the Conservative government’s decision first to switch to a 
three-day week to preserve coal stocks and then to call a general election on the theme 
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of “who governs?,” which it promptly lost, followed by five years of Labour govern-
ment. The theme of economic decline grew louder, instanced by the chaotic strategic 
planning and dire industrial relations at the British Leyland car manufacturer and clo-
sures in shipbuilding, which led to the upsurge of trade union militancy and the sit-in 
at the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders in 1971.47 It was a time of noisy politics, when rela-
tions between employers, trade unions, and the state were highly conflictual and 
salient to the broader electorate.
Victory in the referendum was seen as important for rebuilding the power of the 
business elites and undermining trade union and left alternatives. It depended on a uni-
fied business elite, committed to EC membership, exerting both structural and instru-
mental power. It also benefited from the legitimacy of the key arguments, which were 
based on a discursive framework around the European Communities as a pathway to 
modernization, economic growth, and a new industrial order. Noisy as the debate was, 
business was still able to achieve its goals, thanks in part to its effective mobilization 
of both small and large companies, but also because the business account of the crisis 
and of the need for modernization resonated with much of the British media and the 
general public.
The context in 2016 was similar in some ways and different in others. A crucial 
similarity was that the referendum took place in a context of crisis, and the governing 
party (in this case the Conservative Party rather than Labour) was split on the issue. 
Although Prime Minister David Cameron supported remaining in the European Union, 
many prominent Conservatives were, like Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, leading 
figures in the Leave campaign. However, a key difference was that capitalism itself 
was not being challenged by a powerful alternative. First, unlike 1975, there was an 
ostensibly pro-business Conservative government in office. Second, by 2016 the trade 
union movement in the United Kingdom was a considerably reduced power, so there 
was a much weaker challenge to business from the left.48 The Labour Party leadership 
under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (and in opposition, under Ed Miliband) had 
increasingly accommodated itself to a broadly neoliberal agenda of markets, financial-
ization, a workfare-oriented welfare state, and privatization, while making various 
efforts to improve public infrastructure and to address the most extreme levels of pov-
erty and challenges of youth and long-term unemployment.49 The idea of a left-wing 
economic strategy that departed from this framework, spearheaded by a Labour Party 
supported by a revived trade union movement, was totally lacking until the surprise 
election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader in September 2015, just nine months 
before the referendum. For many decades British business elites had not faced any 
existential threat to their collective existence.
As to the legitimacy of business intervention, the crisis in 2016 was articulated very 
differently. Its roots lay in the response to the 2008 global financial crisis and the fact 
that much of the policymaking establishment had offered little to address the growing 
disillusion among many voters, derived from years of austerity, declining public ser-
vices, stagnating wages, and widening inequality both between individuals and also 
between and within regions. The generalized dissatisfaction was stoked in part by 
declining trust in politicians and elites following the expenses and the phone-hacking 
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scandals, both of which discredited politicians and their advisers, the police, and parts 
of the media.50 This crisis was articulated and most powerfully made visible not 
through a critique of capitalism but by linking it to the role of the European Union, 
which was portrayed as a key element of the status quo. Many Conservative and UKIP 
politicians supported by mass-circulation newspapers framed the problems as the 
result of “unlimited EU immigration,” a “lack of border controls,” and an unelected 
EU Commission costing British taxpayers huge sums of money and enforcing inap-
propriate regulations that damaged British industry and undermined its competitive-
ness. All of this was enveloped within a sense of grievance against the European 
Union, articulated in stories in the mass media about regulations supposedly banning 
“bendy bananas” and prawn cocktail crisps and—in grander language smacking of 
deep historical nostalgia—depriving the United Kingdom of its sovereignty and turn-
ing it into a “vassal” of Brussels.51
Business faced a dilemma over how to engage with this debate. On the one hand, it 
was not a context in which the basics of business or private ownership were being 
threatened as they had been in the mid-1970s. On the other hand, the UK economy was 
deeply enmeshed with the European Union in many ways, and separation would have 
multiple problematic consequences. The ambivalence reflected a growing recognition 
in some parts of the financial markets that EU regulation and efforts to build stronger 
integrative mechanisms within the Eurozone and the European Central Bank were 
going to have real effects on the way the City conducted business, effects that could 
weaken the City’s s preeminence as a global financial center and the center of key EU 
financial markets.52
British business was therefore far from united in its efforts to support Remain in the 
referendum. Tensions had been growing over the last decade across a number of 
spheres between the direction of the European Union and the preferences of British 
businesses in relation to liberalizing markets and opposing regulation.53 No doubt 
these tensions were exacerbated by other factors, such as the continual anti-EU tone of 
much of the UK media and the increasing Euroscepticism within the Conservative 
party, which fed on this and more drastically the rise of UKIP as an electoral force for 
the expression of anti-EU feeling.54 The combination of issues of regulation and 
bureaucracy; media stories of corruption, red tape, and “gold plating”; and the grow-
ing use of immigration to exemplify problems created by EU membership created a 
wider Brexit discourse that affected a whole range of businesses, whether they were 
connected to EU markets and supply chains or not.
The highly politicized debate about EU membership, which rapidly became 
extremely noisy once the referendum was called, raised the stakes of business inter-
vention, as firms worried that supporting the Remain campaign risked alienating pro-
Brexit customers and employees. The danger to business grew as the campaign 
developed and became increasingly polarized within a populist framing of “the people 
versus the establishment” that claimed the establishment had benefited from the years 
of austerity while the people had been “neglected.” The more business backed what 
was seen as the establishment position, the more it would find itself on one side of a 
highly polarized and vicious debate, accused of trying to scare the public 
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into supporting Remain by continually presenting what were described as “doomsday 
scenarios” for the United Kingdom post-Brexit. Project Fear, as it became known, was 
increasingly rubbished as an establishment conspiracy. As Michael Gove, campaign-
ing for Brexit, explained, “People in this country have had enough of experts.”55
The result was that in contrast to 1975, many individual businesses were cautious 
about taking on too high a profile in the Remain camp. Even big car producers who 
were very concerned about Brexit, such as Nissan in Sunderland, chose not to take a 
strong public position when invited to do so.56 Some businesses felt that the Remain 
side was going to win anyway, given some of the early opinion polls, so they did not 
need to risk anything themselves. Practically all businesses conducted themselves 
much more cautiously than they had done in 1975, contenting themselves, if they went 
public, with signing letters, making press statements, and issuing reports. There were 
no reports of employers’ trying to influence their employees directly to vote for 
Remain by calling them to meetings or leafleting them at their place of work. Many 
employers preferred to remain relatively “invisible,” if not indifferent, while others 
were increasingly hostile. Business was less willing to go public in such a context; 
pro-EU business sentiment was increasingly derided as special pleading on behalf of 
its own establishment interests. Business found that substantial parts of the electorate 
and many politicians no longer listened to its views with the respect it had previously 
enjoyed. It had lost its legitimacy as a neutral voice articulating a “common sense” 
hegemonic view of what the economy needed.
Structural Changes and British Business Elites
In this section, we study the coordinating capacity of the business elite by analyzing 
key structural changes in the British political economy that contributed to the differ-
ences between the two referendum campaigns by shaping the mobilizational capacity 
of business elites. As a liberal market economy, the United Kingdom has long been 
characterized by a relatively weak coordinating capacity among both workers and 
employers, thereby stifling policy reforms relying on coordination, such as the 
National Economic Development Council in the 1960s.57 However, our argument is 
that a variety of structural changes further weakened the coordinating capacity of 
business and created a context in which strong business influence on referendum 
outcomes was less likely in 2016 than in 1975. We present our analysis of changes in 
ownership and control of British businesses and in their supply chains and show that 
these developments have reshaped the nature of the British business elite, making it 
less cohesive and affecting its capability to exercise power in a collective fashion. 
Our argument also relates to a broader transformation of collective action by busi-
ness, including changes to employer associations, which have fewer members and 
increasingly engage with new issues and civil society organizations rather than tradi-
tional collective bargaining.58
In 1975, the British economy was predominantly organized around British-owned 
firms. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) into the United Kingdom had been 
increasing slowly, it was mainly confined to car manufacturing with UK-based 
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subsidiaries of Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, dating in some cases from much 
earlier in the century. Manufacturing was still the predominant UK employer, with 
large establishments in car, lorry, and bus production; light and heavy engineering; 
defense and aerospace; iron and steel works; petroleum refining; and textiles. Large 
supermarkets were only just beginning to make an impression on High Street, and out-
of-town megastores were still in the future, so Napoleon’s dismissive remark that 
Britain was “a nation of shopkeepers” retained some truth. Miners and dockers were 
still employed in the thousands. White-collar work had been expanding through the 
1960s in insurance and retail banking, which were dominated by UK-based and 
UK-owned financial institutions.
The City of London was by the 1970s engaged in international markets for foreign 
exchange, insurance, and bond issuance but was predominantly British in ownership. 
The large clearing banks were all British-owned and expected to remain that way. 
What were known as merchant banks had a predominantly partnership structure, thus 
limiting the scale of risk they took on, and were also British-owned. They engaged 
mainly in organizing mergers and acquisitions activity and takeovers, on the one hand, 
and on the other hand bringing together funds to buy bonds to fund such activities as 
well as new investments. Usually these activities were carried out between British 
companies and drew on potential investors based in the United Kingdom. The London 
Stock Exchange was a cartel of small UK-based partnership firms divided into the 
specific functions of jobbers (sellers of shares) and brokers (buying from and selling 
to jobbers on behalf of clients). In 1975, institutional investment was predominantly 
the business of insurance companies and pension funds, which were generally cau-
tious in their policies and not activist. Individual investment also remained a signifi-
cant part of ownership structures, but this group too was generally passive, holding on 
to shares for relatively long periods.59 Managers of large companies had considerable 
autonomy in how they developed their businesses, which led in some cases to limited 
investment in technology, poor industrial relations, and a general lack of modern man-
agement techniques.60
At the top end (chief executives and senior partners, the leaders of the civil service, 
the Bank of England) was a relatively homogeneous, male, white, business elite, as 
reflected in the number of interlocking directorships between the banks and the largest 
companies and in the shared social and cultural capital they developed through social-
ization in the public schools, Oxbridge, and the annual London season of events 
attended by “the great and the good,” as well as informal circles in institutions such as 
the Gentlemen’s Clubs of Pall Mall and St. James’s.61 As a result, the business elite 
was relatively cohesive and characterized by extensive social ties.
By contrast, the structure of the British economy in terms of ownership had consid-
erably changed by 2016, which affected the homogeneity and “clubability” of the 
British business elites. The transformation has been described in detail in many 
sources, so here we summarize the key points and their implications for the business 
elites.62 One of the most important changes is the rise of the City of London to pre-
dominance within the wider economy and the spread of financialization and share-
holder-value-driven ideology through the United Kingdom. The City is now composed 
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of the subsidiaries of many international financial institutions, predominantly from the 
United States and Europe. For several decades, this change has been described as the 
“Wimbledonization” of the City—that is, a game played in the United Kingdom but in 
which all the main players and winners are from other countries. Financial institutions 
are the main intermediaries and owners operating in the financial markets, where they 
push firms to become ever-more driven by shareholder value. Rewards in these mar-
kets and in shareholder-value-driven firms have increased dramatically at the upper 
levels of management, leading to an ever-widening pay gulf within organizations.63
Under the impact of the withdrawal of capital controls in the 1980s, FDI into the 
United Kingdom grew enormously, particularly as many companies from Japan, the 
United States, India, and others outside the European Union saw the relatively deregu-
lated United Kingdom as the best place to establish a bridgehead for their products 
behind EU tariff walls. The United Kingdom was also relatively open to hostile take-
overs from foreign firms, which over the years has led to the loss of ownership to 
overseas companies. Takeovers often led to more global restructuring and consolida-
tion of manufacturing and R&D activities. As a result, jobs and research centers were 
lost from the United Kingdom. By 2016 most of its shrunken manufacturing base was 
owned by foreign MNCs, often expressly with the purpose of accessing the European 
Union. Only a small proportion around food processing and aerospace and defense 
remained British-owned, although in the latter case the need for large investments led 
to strong connectedness with both the United States and some EU companies (most 
obviously Airbus). Manufacturing MNCs were increasingly international in their 
organization of production, utilizing a multiplicity of subcontractors in the develop-
ment, production, and distribution of the final products. Many of the subcontracting 
and supply chains were European, but many were based on the expansion and opening 
up of trade with China and other East and Southeast Asian economies.
The expanded services sector beyond finance was partly a consequence of the 
state’s withdrawal from activities that were now to be subcontracted to the private sec-
tor, a shift that helped create and sustain large management consulting firms and other 
more specialist providers of outsourced services in social care, prisons, hospitals, and 
infrastructure management.64 A number of these became global providers of such ser-
vices. A small number of large supermarkets began to dominate groceries both in con-
sumer markets and in supply chains. They remained largely UK-based and owned, 
apart from Asda (owned by the US company Walmart) and recent entrants such as Aldi 
and Lidl from EU countries.
The result of these changes was a fragmentation of social background, cultural 
homogeneity, and shared interests.65 More leaders of big businesses based in the 
United Kingdom were from overseas and were less likely to be embedded within the 
social networks of the old elites. UK business leaders themselves were increasingly 
drawn from outside the elite networks that dominated the earlier period. What con-
cerned them all was the fate of their own companies and their own rewards in the 
context of the dominant shareholder-value orientation pressed on them by the financial 
markets and their owners.66 In that respect, Brexit was an issue insofar as it affected 
their business strategies. The exact nature of the effect was difficult for many 
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companies to predict in detail, but for some it was obvious. Foreign non-EU MNCs 
that had manufacturing facilities in the United Kingdom precisely to enable them to 
sell in the European Union—Japanese and Indian car manufacturers, for example—
were opposed to Brexit. Mostly these were also MNCs with complex supply chains 
that crisscrossed national borders within the European Union and for whom the ease 
of movement of goods, services, and people within the European Union (and the 
diversity of high-skilled and low-skilled workforces in regions with different cost 
structures) offered great opportunities to minimize costs and maximize market access. 
UK-originated MNCs, such as aerospace companies and their highly intricate supply 
chains linked into Airbus, as well as larger engineering manufacturers were also 
threatened by the disruption to supply chains, innovation networks, and markets 
implied by Brexit. Logistics and distribution companies including East Coast ports 
that carried this trade within and across EU countries saw clear threats to their busi-
ness, as did passenger and freight airlines (and the regional airports that supported 
them throughout the United Kingdom), which depended on maintaining their freedom 
to fly around the EU space as a privilege of EU membership. Banks and other profes-
sional services (such as management consultancy, lawyers, accountants, and archi-
tects) that were able to sell across the European Union without restriction and therefore 
depended on the European market were strong Remain supporters. Brexit would be 
likely to change single passporting arrangements whereby recognition in one EU 
country was sufficient, in principle, to allow practice in any other country subject to 
local conditions (which were supposedly becoming more convergent). The fact that 
many of the banks based in London were actually incorporated inside other EU coun-
tries, however, meant that they would not be locked outside the European Union; they 
would just find themselves more tightly regulated in some of their more complex 
financial products than they had been. Also, any restrictions on freedom of movement 
could affect their strategy to draw from global talent pools and deploy people flexibly 
according to their expertise and with little regard for nationality.67 Creative and IT 
industries also put a high premium on freedom of movement around the European 
Union even though many of their products were designed for global markets (particu-
larly expanding US and Asian markets when it came to computer apps and games) and 
did not depend on the European Union (where marked differences of cultural tradition 
and more interventionist regulatory regimes in music, media, and film remained). The 
personal care sector and health services were also highly dependent on freedom of 
movement for their workforce, as were many agricultural sectors where seasonal 
demands for workers were increasingly met by employees from East and Central 
European EU members. All of these sectors and others had developed corporate strate-
gies that were in various ways crucially dependent on existing EU membership. In this 
they were often the same companies that had benefited most from EU membership.
But there were other companies that were more distant and cautious. The large 
supermarket chains and other British retailers, for example, had never successfully 
implanted themselves in the European Union, and a number of such efforts have forced 
them into expensive and ignominious withdrawals from all but a few flagship stores in 
major European cities. Dependence on supply chain linkages into the European Union 
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was high in some sectors of food and drink but much less so in others, including food, 
toys, clothes, and electronics, as cheaper imports from China and other Asian econo-
mies were available. Many of their supply chains related to relatively simple products, 
and they could and often did switch source locations quickly to meet price changes and 
other market conditions. This contrasted with the much more complex and interdepen-
dent supply chains of the advanced manufacturing sector. As mentioned, supermarkets 
and retailers were relatively quiet in the Brexit referendum, although there were some 
who supported Brexit directly, such as Lord Harris, a long-standing Conservative sup-
porter and founder of the large retailer Carpetright, and Tim Martin, founder of the 
retail pub chain Wetherspoons, neither of whom had much dependence on EU markets 
or supply chains.
Some manufacturers claimed that the EU market with its regulations was not worth 
the trouble and that they had found much more open and faster-growing markets out-
side the European Union—the influential entrepreneur and self-publicist James Dyson 
was the most significant manufacturer to make this claim (having moved his produc-
tion to Malaysia some years earlier while keeping design and innovation in the United 
Kingdom).68 Another example was the chairman of JCB, Lord Bamford, who said in a 
Daily Mail article that the British-made content of JCB diggers—assembled in the 
United Kingdom—had dropped to 36 percent in 2010 from 90 percent in 1979.69 
Supply chains and assembly in manufacturing as well as some IT services were 
increasingly provided by China, India, and other Asian economies, which in turn were 
becoming more important and faster-growing consumer markets than in the past. They 
were also rapidly modernizing their logistics and distribution systems to facilitate 
exports (e.g., China’s Belt and Road initiative), enabling them to compete with East 
and Central European locations. Developments in Asia coupled with the continued 
draw of US consumer markets did offer an attraction to some manufacturers, although 
few were willing to go so far as Dyson in turning their backs on the European Union.
Another interesting example of a pro-Brexit business is the Bristol Ports Company, 
the large container and ports docks at Avonmouth near Bristol, which according to its 
website handles 27 percent of all UK aviation fuel imports, six million tons of dry bulk 
goods, 25 percent of all animal feed, 750,000 motor vehicle imports, and 10 percent of 
UK coal imports for electricity generation and contributes to around 10,000 jobs in its 
immediate area. One of its owners, Terry Mordaunt, was the thirteenth-largest donor 
to Vote Leave and gave £50k to the Brexit campaign.70 Avonmouth on the West Coast 
of England was mainly an entrepôt for US and Japanese cars as well as oil and gas 
from the Arab Gulf. Its self-interest lay in expanding those linkages, unlike container 
ports on the East Coast, such as Felixstowe and Tilbury, that drew trade from the 
European Union. Inside the City of London and in financial services outside London 
(such as those run by the two biggest donors to Brexit, Arron Banks and Peter 
Hargreaves of Bristol-based Hargreaves Lansdown), there were a number of promi-
nent Brexiteers concerned about increasing EU regulation related to Eurozone con-
solidation and its potential effects on financial services.
Finally, it is clear that there were substantial economic interests in the UK media 
that were anti-EU. Unlike the 1975 referendum, when most newspapers were in favor 
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of EC membership (even tabloids that would later be strongly against the European 
Union), a recent study from the Reuters Institute at Oxford University found that “of 
the articles focused on the referendum 41 percent were pro-Leave as against 27 per-
cent pro-Remain, marking a dominant pro-Brexit bias” in 2016.71 Most discussion 
suggests that the ideological orientation of the owners was key, but from our point of 
view another contributing factor is the business strategy of the firms that run these 
newspapers. The Murdoch empire had been entangled in EU regulatory disputes for 
some time about the market share of its various media groups, particularly broadcast-
ing, and the impact of this on competition and the nature of news. Murdoch media 
had taken an increasingly aggressive anti-EU stance for decades. Other newspapers 
such as the Daily Mail (owned by the Rothermere family) and the Daily Telegraph 
(owned by the Barclay brothers) were also resolutely anti-EU. From the point of view 
of the business strategy of these newspaper companies, consolidation across national 
boundaries has been limited. Only the Murdoch empire has really achieved it, and it 
has been across relatively open Anglophone liberal market economies—Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Most European countries over the last 
century have retained a core of national newspapers that are locally owned. Papers 
like the Daily Mail and the Telegraph have no interest in an EU market for themselves 
and can afford to promote Brexit without worrying about the economic consequences 
for their own business.
To conclude, the British business elite had become more fractured in social and 
economic terms, along several dimensions. First, social ties among firms and manag-
ers have weakened as a result of internationalization and changes to the corporate elite, 
thereby weakening the coordinating capacity of firms. Fragmentation is also reflected 
in the changes in collective representation by employers’ associations.72 Second, as 
companies increasingly focused on their own direct interests, it is important to note 
that these interests were more diverse than in the 1970s, reflecting changes in the sec-
toral composition of the British economy and the more limited dependence on EU 
markets exhibited by some key firms. There was no united business sector that could 
collaborate with unions to promote support for the European Union, as there was in 
countries like Denmark, for example, which established the pro-EU think tank Europa. 
Third, these trends also relate to Davis’s recent argument about “irresponsible elites,” 
who are mostly focused on maximizing short-term gains related to shareholder value.73 
In retrospect, having seen what happened in the chaotic negotiations about Brexit 
since the referendum, some companies have come to regret their relative insouciance 
in the lead-up to June 2016. But this fragmentation is important to understanding why 
such a weak case was made for Remain compared to the 1975 referendum, when busi-
ness influence was highly visible.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has compared the role business played in the two referenda on the United 
Kingdom’s membership in the European Communities and the European Union as 
case studies of business influence under conditions of noisy politics. The comparison 
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suggests that business power is variable over time, even in the context of the same 
issue (a referendum on EC/EU membership), the same general level of “noisiness,” 
and the same country.
In the early 1970s, political opposition to big business was strong and threatened 
the profitability of businesses. By the mid-1970s, capital was responding by shrinking 
its investment in the United Kingdom, selling off sterling, and pushing up prices of 
goods, which led to increasing inflation and rising interest rates. These developments 
in turn led to crises, such as the IMF rescue, which reflected the split in the Labour 
Party between those willing to risk the future on the Alternative Economic Strategy 
and those who saw no alternative but to buckle to this pressure. The 1975 referendum 
was an important moment in the process, showing how united business was in organiz-
ing a campaign to stay in the European Communities, which they saw as essential to 
defeating the left-wing AES policy. In 2016, business did not perceive a crisis that 
threatened their very existence; they thus did not feel a strong incentive to work 
together and campaign collectively for staying in the European Union. Rather, they 
were divided about the merits of staying: some businesses advocated Brexit while oth-
ers were at best lukewarm, in part because of EU regulatory activity and in part because 
of the degree of hostility to the European Union and to Project Fear among the media 
and the electorate.
We have also stressed the ways in which contextual factors, notably common 
understandings of the crises in conjunction with the two referendum campaigns, 
impinged on the legitimacy of business claims and thereby also on their ability to 
exercise ideational power. Unlike in 1975, business’s efforts to present its position in 
“trade narrative” terms—that is, that business had the best interests of UK society at 
heart and presented a neutral, expert-based view of the consequences of Brexit—were 
delegitimated by a continuous campaign of noisy politics that challenged the notion of 
experts and the idea of an establishment consensus that had to be accepted. Instead, 
business was portrayed as a special interest group that had benefited by its ability to 
bend politicians to its will against the “people.” The Brexit argument was that the 
“establishment” and the business elites were using all their (instrumental) power in 
terms of lobbying, media domination, and framing to press the case for continued 
membership so that they could sustain their privileged position. To advocate Remain 
was to risk becoming the personalized target of social media and newspaper cam-
paigns designed to delegitimate this position. Brexit campaigners portrayed them-
selves as supporters of democracy and “the will of the people” rather than the special 
interests of business. The more business elites pressed their case using experts and 
Project Fear, the more Brexiteers engaged in criticism of the individuals and organiza-
tions propounding those views.
We have also related the analysis to the ways business elites have changed in form 
over the last forty years, reflecting and contributing to the changes in the UK political 
economy. By 2016, businesses were driven by narrow shareholder considerations, 
which focused the attention of their senior leaders on maximizing returns by taking 
advantage of opportunities facilitated by globalization (and Europeanization), finan-
cialization, and a weak trade union movement. These trends had fragmented the 
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interests of the business elites by creating a far more complex industrial and services 
structure in 2016 than in 1975. The leaders of these firms were also more fragmented 
and had limited networks into other firms or into the collective associations of busi-
ness, except where those could serve their own personal ambitions. In 2016, they were 
not just unable to put together a case for Remain that went beyond simply promoting 
their own interests; in many cases, they were not even aware that a case was necessary: 
hence the shock of some of them at the result. Our analysis has integrated an under-
standing of the changing nature of the UK political economy with an understanding of 
how the business elite itself was changing.
This analysis also has several broader implications for the comparative study of 
business power. It shows that it is not noisy politics per se that undermines business 
influence. Under certain conditions, business can still win out in noisy politics, but a 
variety of factors complicate the exercise of business influence in such circumstances, 
and the structural power of business is not in itself sufficient to ensure that business 
interests win out. On the basis of our analysis of the British case, we argue that effec-
tive business power in such circumstances depends on three sets of factors.
First, the active exercise of business power is costly and reflects the challenges 
perceived by business. The greater the perceived threat, the more likely it is that busi-
ness will invest the necessary resources needed to influence noisy politics, which 
echoes the insights from earlier scholarship on business mobilization but has received 
less attention in recent work on business power.74 In other words, it is not sufficient to 
consider business preferences and interests in the abstract. The goals of business action 
may relate to the exercise of countervailing power, pushing back against threats from 
governments or other social actors. This fact is evident in the business mobilization for 
EC membership in 1975, and there are also some parallels to business resistance in 
Sweden against wage earner funds in the 1970s and early 1980s.75 Given that business 
intervention in noisy politics is costly, such intervention is very unlikely, unless there 
are clear incentives to get involved.
Second, the analysis has also highlighted the importance of legitimacy as a factor 
shaping business influence. In 1975 business appeals about the urgency of moderniza-
tion were perceived as legitimate, as they dovetailed with dominant understandings of 
the crisis. By contrast, in 2016 business claims were more commonly viewed as self-
serving and as an element of Project Fear. While not a strict prerequisite for business 
mobilization as such, the perceived legitimacy of key business claims is likely to con-
tribute to both the degree and success of business involvement.
Third, we argue that the structure and organization of business is an essential deter-
minant of the mobilizational capacity of the business sector as a whole; strong incen-
tives by themselves are unlikely to be sufficient to ensure successful mobilization. In 
much the same way that the varieties of capitalism literature has shown that business 
preferences and activities vary across different institutional settings,76 we have argued 
that the structure of the political economy shapes the ability of the business sector to 
exercise power in a cohesive fashion. While the transformation of the British economy 
has not necessarily undermined the capacity of individual firms to exercise power and 
influence, the fragmentation of the business elite over the last forty years of 
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globalization and financialization has made it harder for business as a whole to find 
common ground and to act with a common purpose. This fragmentation impinged on 
the capacity of the business sector to act cohesively in the Brexit campaign.
Similar factors may have constrained the exercise of business power in other 
countries as well. First, although the fragmentation of the business elite has gone 
furthest in liberal market economies such as the United Kingdom and the United 
States, processes of financialization and structural change are likely to have weak-
ened business’s collective power elsewhere as well, to the extent that a cohesive busi-
ness elite is a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of power. Second, the lack of 
existential threat to business as a collectivity in the neoliberal age has reinforced this 
fragmentation. To the extent that business takes the core tenets of liberal capitalism 
for granted, it is less likely to invest the time and resources needed to engage with 
policymaking, especially if coordination with other businesses is difficult and there is 
a temptation to act opportunistically. However, the danger of this approach is that it 
blindsides business elites when they face populist challenges related to rising inequal-
ity and other tensions associated with the neoliberal era. Similarly, populist politics 
also facilitates the questioning of the legitimacy of the business voice, particularly 
where it can be contrasted to the “will of the people,” and this in turn weakens the 
ability of business under conditions of noisy politics to project its own ideational 
power and goals as in the common interest.
Therefore, we suggest that future work on business power explore whether the 
three factors identified in this article are generalizable and explain the exercise of busi-
ness power under conditions of noisy politics elsewhere. Given the increasing politici-
zation of economic policy in the current era of populism, a better understanding of the 
role of business influence under conditions of noisy politics is very important.
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